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The Role of Naturalness in Lewis’s Theory of Meaning
Brian Weatherson
Many  writers  have  held  that  in  his  later  work,  David  Lewis 
adopted a theory of predicate meaning such that the meaning of a 
predicate is the most natural property that is (mostly) consistent 
with the way the predicate is used. That orthodox interpretation is 
shared by both supporters and critics of Lewis's theory of mean-
ing,  but  it  has  recently  been  strongly  criticised  by  Wolfgang 
Schwarz. In this paper, I accept many of Schwarz's criticisms of the 
orthodox interpretation, and add some more. But I also argue that 
the orthodox interpretation  has a grain of truth in it, and seeing 
that  helps  us  appreciate  the  strength  of  Lewis's  late  theory  of 
meaning.The Role of Naturalness in 
Lewis’s Theory of Meaning
Brian Weatherson
It is sometimes claimed (e.g., by (Sider 2001a; Sider 2001b; Sider 
2012 sec 3.2; Stalnaker 2004; Williams 2007; Weatherson 2003)) that 
David Lewis’s theory of predicate meaning  assigns a central role 
to naturalness.1 Some  of the people who claim  this also say that 
the theory they attribute to Lewis is true. The authors I have men-
tioned aren’t as explicit as each other about exactly which theory 
they are attributing to Lewis, but the rough intuitive idea is that 
the  meaning  of a  predicate  is  the  most natural  property  that  is 
more-or-less consistent with the usage of the predicate. Call  this 
kind of interpretation the ‘orthodox’ interpretation of Lewis.2 Re-
cently Wolfgang  Schwarz (2009, 209ff) has argued that the ortho-
dox interpretation is a misinterpretation, and actually naturalness 
plays a much  smaller role in  Lewis’s theory of meaning  than  is 
standardly  assumed.3   Simplifying  a  lot,  one  key  strand  in 
Schwarz’s interpretation  is that naturalness plays no role  in  the 
theory of meaning in (Lewis 1969; Lewis 1975), since Lewis hadn’t 
formulated the concept yet, and Lewis didn’t abandon that theory 
of meaning, since he never announced he was abandoning  it, so 
naturalness doesn’t play anything  like the role orthodoxy assigns 
to it.
In this article I attempt to steer a middle ground between these 
two positions. I’m going  to defend the following parcel of theses. 
These are all exegetical claims, but I’m also interested in defending 
most of the theses that I  ultimately attribute to Lewis, so getting 
clear on just what Lewis meant is of more than historical interest.
1.Naturalness matters to Lewis’s (post-1983) theory of sentence 
meaning only insofar as it matters to his theory of rationality, 
and the theory of rationality matters to the (pre- and post-1983) 
theory of meaning.
2.Naturalness might play a slightly more direct role in Lewis’s 
theory of word meaning, but it isn’t nearly as signiﬁcant as the 
orthodox view suggests.
3.When we work through Lewis’s theory of word and sentence 
meaning, we see that the orthodox interpretation assigns to 
Lewis a theory that isn’t his theory of meaning, but is by his 
lights a useful heuristic.
4.An even better heuristic than ‘meaning = use plus naturalness’ 
would be ‘meaning = predication plus naturalness’, but even 
this would be a fallible heuristic, not a theory.
5.When correctly interpreted, Lewis’s theory is invulnerable to 
the challenges put forward by Williams (2007).
I’m going to start by saying  a little about the many roles natural-
ness plays in Lewis’s philosophy, and about his big picture views 
on thought and meaning. Then I’ll offer a number of arguments 
against the orthodox interpretation of Lewis’s theory of sentence 
meaning. After that, I’ll turn to Lewis’s theory of word meaning, 
where it is harder to be quite clear about just what the theory is, 
and  how  much  it  might have  changed  once  natural  properties 
were added to the metaphysics.
1. How Naturalness Enters The Theory of Meaning
Most of the core elements of David Lewis’s philosophy were pre-
sent, at least in outline, from his earliest work. The big exception is 
the theory of natural properties introduced in (Lewis 1983). As he 
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plied to possibilia is all the theory of properties that anyone could 
ever need” (Lewis 1983, 377n). Once he introduces this new con-
cept of naturalness, Lewis puts it to all sorts of work throughout 
his philosophy. I’m rather sceptical that there is any one feature of 
properties that can do all the varied jobs Lewis wants naturalness 
to do, but the grounds for, and consequences of, this scepticism are 
a little orthogonal to the main  theme of this paper, so I’ve set it 
aside.
As the orthodox interpretation stresses, Lewis has naturalness 
do some work in this theory of content. That he does think there’s 
a connection between naturalness and content is undeniable from 
the most casual reading  of his post-1983 work. But just how they 
are connected is less obvious. To spell out these connections, let’s 
start with three Lewisian themes.
• Facts about linguistic meaning are to be explained in terms of 
facts about minds. In particular, to speak a language ℒ is to 
have a convention of being truthful and trusting in ℒ (Lewis 
1969; Lewis 1975). And to have such a convention is a matter of 
having certain beliefs and desires. So mental content is consid-
erably prior to linguistic content in a Lewisian theory. Moreo-
ver, Lewis’s theory of linguistic content is, in the ﬁrst instance, 
a theory of sentence meaning, not a theory of word meaning.4
• The principle of charity plays a central role in Lewis’s theory of 
mental content (Lewis 1974; Lewis 1994). To a ﬁrst approxima-
tion, a creature believes that p iff the best interpretation of the 
creature’s behavioural dispositions includes the attribution of 
the belief that p to the creature. And, ceteris paribus, it is better 
to interpret a creature so that it is more rather than less ra-
tional. It will be pretty important for what follows that Lewis 
adopts a principle of charity that highlights rationality, not 
truth. It is also important to Lewis that we don’t just interpret 
the individual creature, but creatures of a kind (Lewis 1980). 
I’m not going to focus on the social externalist features of 
Lewis’s theory of mental states, but I think they assist the 
broader story I want to tell.
• Lewis’s theory of mental content has it that mental contents are 
(what most of us would call) properties, not (what most of us 
would call) propositions (Lewis 1979). So a theory of natural 
properties can easily play a role in the theory of mental con-
tent, since mental contents are properties. If you think mental 
contents are propositions, the connection between naturalness 
and mental content will be more indirect. Just how indirect it is 
will depend on what your theory of propositions is. But if men-
tal contents are Lewisian propositions, the connection may be 
very indirect indeed. After all, propositions that we might pick 
out with sentences containing words that denote very unnatu-
ral properties, such as All emeroses are gred, might be intuitively 
very natural.
Now let’s see why we might end up with naturalness in the theory 
of meaning. An agent has certain dispositions. For instance, after 
seeing a bunch of green emeralds, and no non-green emeralds, in a 
large and diverse range of environments, she has a disposition to 
say “All emeralds are green”. In virtue of what is she speaking  a 
language in which “green” means green, and not grue? (Note that 
when I use “grue”, I mean a property that only differs from green-
ness among  objects which it is easy to tell that neither our agent, 
nor any of her interlocutors, could possibly be acquainted with at 
the time she makes the utterance in question.)
Let’s say that ℒ1  is English, i.e., a language in which “green” 
means green, and ℒ2 a language which is similar to ℒ1 except that 
“green” means grue. Our question is, what makes it the case that 
the agent is speaking ℒ1 and not ℒ2? That is, what makes it the 
case that the agent has adopted the convention of being truthful 
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trusting in ℒ2?
We assumed that the agent has seen a lot of emeralds which 
are both green and grue. To a ﬁrst approximation, it is more chari-
table to attribute to the agent the belief that all emeralds are green 
than  the  belief  that  all  emeralds are  grue  because  greenness  is 
more natural than gruesomeness. As Lewis says, “The principles 
of charity will  impute a bias towards believing  things are green 
rather than grue” (1983, 375). And for Lewis, charity requires im-
puting  more reasonable interpretations. But why is it more chari-
table to attribute beliefs about greenness to beliefs about grueness? 
I think it is because we need more evidence to rationally form a 
belief that some class of things are all grue than we need to form a 
belief that everything  in that class is green. And that’s because, 
ceteris paribus, we need more evidence to rationally form a belief 
that all Fs are Gs than that all Fs are Hs when G is less natural than 
H. The agent has, we might assume, sufﬁcient evidence to ration-
ally believe that all emeralds are green, but not sufﬁcient evidence 
to believe that all emeralds are grue.
So the ﬁrst two Lewisian themes notes above, the reduction of 
linguistic  meaning  to  mental  content,  and  the  centrality  of  a 
rationality-based principle  of charity,  push  us towards thinking 
that naturalness is closely connected to mental content and hence 
to linguistic meaning. And it has pushed us towards thinking that 
if naturalness is connected to meaning, it is via this connection I’ve 
posited between naturalness and rational belief. Note that Lewis 
doesn’t ever endorse anything like that general a connection, but I 
suspect he had something like this in mind when he wrote the sen-
tence I quoted in the previous paragraph. We’ll come back to this 
interpretative question at some length below.
But the argument I offered was a bit quick, because I ignored 
the third Lewisian  theme: beliefs are relations to properties, not 
propositions. On  Lewis’s theory, to believe that all emeralds are 
green is to self-ascribe the property of being in a world where all 
emeralds are green. So if a certain body of evidence makes it pos-
sible for the agent to rationally believe that all emeralds are green, 
but not for her to believe that all emeralds are grue, and that’s be-
cause rationality  is constitutively  connected to naturalness, then 
that must be because the ﬁrst of the following  properties is more 
natural than the second:
• Being in a world where all emeralds are green
• Being in a world where all emeralds are grue
That could still be true, though it is notable how far removed we 
are  from  the  intuitions  that  motivate  the  distinctions  between 
more and less natural properties. It’s not like there is some sense, 
intuitively,  in  which  things that  have  the  ﬁrst  property  form  a 
more uniﬁed class than things that have the second property. The 
striking difference between these two properties lies not in meta-
physics, but in epistemology. It takes much less evidence to self-
ascribe the former than the latter. Perhaps there is an explanation 
of that in metaphysical terms. But even if so, the explanation will 
be  long  and complicated,  and  the  epistemological  point  simple 
and direct.
So it’s plausible that naturalness is connected to mental con-
tent, at least as long as naturalness is connected to rational belief. 
And since mental content is connected to linguistic content, we’re 
now  in  the  vicinity  of the  orthodox interpretation.  But I  don’t 
think the orthodox interpretation can be right. I’ll give several rea-
sons for this, starting with the textual evidence for and against it.
2. Textual Evidence about Sentence Meaning
There is some prima facie textual evidence for the orthodox inter-
pretation. But looking more careful at the context of these texts not 
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pretation, but actually tells against it. (This part of the paper is in-
debted even more than the rest to Wolfgang Schwarz’s work, and 
could be easily skipped by those familiar with that work.)
I’ll focus on the last seven pages of “New Work for a Theory of 
Universals”. This is the part of “New Work” that uses the notion 
of naturalness, as introduced in the paper, to respond to Putnam’s 
model-theoretic arguments for massive indeterminacy of meaning. 
Lewis actually responds to Putnam twice over. First, he responds 
to Putnam directly, by showing  how adding naturalness to a use-
based theory of sentence  meaning  avoids the ‘just more  theory’ 
objection that’s central  to Putnam’s argument. And when Lewis 
describes this direct response, he says things that sound a lot like 
the orthodox interpretation.
I would instead propose that the saving constraint concerns the refer-
ent - not the referrer, and not the causal channels between the two. It 
takes two to make a reference, and we will not ﬁnd the constraint if 
we look for it always on the wrong side of the relationship. Reference 
consists in part of what we do in language or thought when we refer, 
but in part it consists in eligibility of the referent. And this eligibility 
to be referred to is a matter of natural properties. (Lewis 1983, 371)
But after this direct response is ﬁnished, Lewis notes that he has 
conceded quite a lot to Putnam in making the response.
You  might  well  protest  that  Putnam’s  problem  is  misconceived, 
wherefore no need has been demonstrated  for resources to  solve it.   
Where are the communicative intentions and the mutual expectations 
that seem to have so much to do with what we mean? In fact, where is 
thought? … I think the point is well taken, but I think it doesn’t mat-
ter. If the problem of intentionality is rightly posed there will still be a 
threat of  radical indeterminacy, there will still be a need for saving 
constraints, there will still be a remedy analogous  to  Merrill’s sug-
gested answer to  Putnam, and  there will still be a need  for  natural 
properties. (Lewis 1983, 373)
I noted earlier that Schwarz makes much of a similar passage in 
“Putnam’s Paradox”, and I think he is right to do so. Here’s a cru-
cial quote from that paper.
I shall acquiesce in Putnam’s linguistic turn: I shall discuss the seman-
tic interpretation of language rather than the assignment of content to 
attitudes, thus  ignoring the possibility that the latter settles  the for-
mer. It would be better, I think, to start with the attitudes and go on to 
language. But I think that would relocate, rather than avoid, the prob-
lem; wherefore  I  may as  well  discuss  it  on  Putnam’s  own  terms. 
(Lewis 1984, 222)
That passage ends with a footnote where he says the ﬁnal section 
of “New Work” contains a version of how the ‘relocated’ problem 
would be solved. So  let’s turn  back  to that.  The  following  long 
portmanteau  quote  from  pages 373 to 375 captures, I  think, the 
heart of my interpretation.
The problem of assigning content to functionally characterised states 
is to be solved by means of constraining principles. Foremost among 
these are principles of ﬁt. … A state typically caused by round things 
before the eyes  is a  good  candidate  for  interpretation as  the visual 
experience of confronting something round; and its typical impact on 
the states interpreted as systems of belief ought to be interpreted as 
the exogenous addition of a belief that one is confronting something 
round, with whatever adjustment that addition calls for. …  Call two 
worlds equivalent iff they are alike in respect of the subject’s evidence 
and behaviour, and note that any decent world is equivalent inter alia 
to  horrendously  counterinductive  worlds  and  to  worlds  where 
everything unobserved by the subject is  horrendously nasty. …  We 
can interchange equivalent  worlds ad lib and preserve ﬁt. So, given 
any ﬁtting and reasonable interpretation, we can transform it into an 
equally ﬁtting perverse interpretation by swapping equivalent worlds 
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expect  radical  indeterminacy  of  interpretation.  We  need  further 
constraints, of the sort called principles of (sophisticated) charity, or of 
'humanity’. [A footnote here refers to  "Radical Interpretation".] Such 
principles call for interpretations according to which the subject has 
attitudes that we would deem reasonable for one who has lived the 
life that he has lived. (Unlike principles of crude charity, they call for 
imputations  of  error  if  he  has  lived  under  deceptive  conditions.) 
These principles select among conﬂicting interpretations that equally 
well  conform  to  the  principles  of  ﬁt.  They impose  apriori  –  albeit 
defeasible -  presumptions  about what  sorts  of  things  are apt  to  be 
believed and desired …  It is  here that we need natural properties. 
The  principles  of  charity  will  impute a  bias  toward believing that 
things are green rather than grue … In short, they will impute eligible 
content … They will impute other things as well, but it is the imputed 
eligibility  that  matters  to  us  at  present.  (Lewis  1983,  373-5,  my 
emphasis)
I think that does a reasonably clear job of supporting the interpre-
tation I set out in the  introduction  over the  orthodox interpreta-
tion. Naturalness matters to linguistic meaning  all right. But the 
chain of inﬂuence is very long and indirect. Naturalness constrains 
what is reasonable, reasonableness constrains charitable interpre-
tations,  charitable  interpretations  constrain  mental  content,  and 
mental content constrains linguistic content. Without naturalness 
at the ﬁrst step, we get excessive indeterminacy of content. With it, 
the Putnamian problems are solved. But there’s no reason here to 
think naturalness has any more direct role to play at any level in 
the theory of linguistic content.
In  short,  Lewis changed  what  he  thought about  rationality 
when he adopted the theory of natural properties. Since rationality 
was a part of his theory of mental content, and mental content de-
termines linguistic content, this change  had downstream  conse-
quences for what he said about linguistic content. But there wasn’t 
any other way his theory of linguistic content changed, nor, contra 
orthodoxy,  any  direct  link  between  naturalness  and  predicate 
meaning.
Moreover, when we look at the closest thing  to a worked ex-
ample in (Lewis 1983), we don’t get any motivation for the ortho-
dox interpretation. Here’s the  example  he  uses,  which  concerns 
mental  content.  Let  f  be  any  one-one  mapping  from  worlds  to 
worlds such that the agent has the same evidence and behaviour 
in w and f (w). Extend f to a mapping from sets of worlds to sets of 
worlds in the following  (standard) way: f (S)={f(w):w∈S}. Then 
the agent’s behaviour will be rationalised by her evidence just 
as much if she has credence function C and value function  V, 
as if she has credence function C′ and value function V′, where 
C′( f(S))=C(S), and V′( f(S))=V(S). To relate this back to the famil-
iar Goodmanian puzzle, let f map any world where all emeralds 
are green to nearest world where all emeralds are grue, and vice 
versa, and map any other  world to itself. Then  the  above argu-
ment will say that the agent’s behaviour is rationalised by her evi-
dence just as much as if her credences are C as if they are C′. That 
is, her behaviour is rationalised by her evidence just as much if she 
gives very high credence to all emeralds being green as to all em-
eralds being grue. So understanding  charity merely as rationaliz-
ing  behaviour leaves us without a way to say that the agent be-
lieves unobserved emeralds are green and not grue.
Lewis’s solution is to say that charity requires more than that. 
In particular, it requires that we assign natural rather than unnatu-
ral beliefs to agents where that is possible. I’ve argued above that 
this makes perfect sense if we connect naturalness with rationality. 
The crucial thing  to note here is that this all happens a long  time 
before we can set out the way that a sentence  is used, since the 
way a sentence is used on Lewis’s theory of linguistic content in-
cludes the beliefs that are formed on hearing it. So the discussion 
in “New Work” suggests that naturalness matters for content, but 
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what I think is the best way to understand Lewis’s theory.
3. Textual Evidence on Naturalness and Rationality
A major part of my argument above was that naturalness affected 
Lewis’s theory of rationality. In particular, once he had naturalness 
to work with, he seemed to think that it was more rational to pro-
ject natural rather than unnatural properties. The textual evidence 
for this is, I’ll admit, fragmentary. But it is fairly widespread. Let’s 
start with a quote we’ve already seen.
The  principles  of  charity  will  impute a  bias  toward believing that 
things are green rather than grue (Lewis 1983, 375)
As noted above, I assume this isn’t a special feature of green and 
grue, but rather that there is a general principle in favour of pro-
jecting natural properties. But it would be good to have more evi-
dence for that.
Lewis returns to the example of the believer in grue emeralds a 
few times. Here is one version of the story in Plurality.
We think that some sorts of belief and desire … would be unreason-
able in a strong sense … utterly unintelligible and nonsensical. Think 
of the man who, for no special reason, expects unexamined emeralds 
to be grue. … What makes the perversely twisted assignment of con-
tent incorrect, however well it ﬁts the subject’s behaviour, is exactly 
that it assigns ineligible, unreasonable content when a more eligible 
assignment would have ﬁt behaviour equally well. (Lewis 1986, 38-9)
And a little later, when replying to Kaplan’s paradox, he says,
Given a ﬁtting assignment, we can scramble it into an equally ﬁtting 
but  perverse  alternative  assignment.  Therefore a  theory of  content 
needs a second part: as well as principles of ﬁt, we need ‘principles of 
humanity’, which create  a presumption in  favour  of  some sorts  of 
content and against others. (Lewis 1986, 107)
He returns to this point again in “Reduction of Mind”.
[Folk psychology] sets presumptive limits  on what  our contents of 
belief  and  desire  can  be. Self-ascribed properties  may be ‘far  from 
fundamental’, I said – but not too far. Especially gruesome gerryman-
ders are prima facie ineligible to  be contents of belief  and desire. In 
short, folk psychology says that we make sense. It credits us with a 
modicum of rationality in our acting, believing and desiring. (Lewis 
1994, 320 in reprint)
The running thread through these last three quotes is that our the-
ory of mental content rules out gruesome assignments, and it does 
this because assigning  rationality is constitutive of correctly inter-
preting. This can only work if naturalness is connected to rational-
ity. I’ve attributed a stronger claim to Lewis, that not only is natu-
ralness  connected  to  rationality,  but  that  the  connection  goes 
through projection.5
One piece of evidence for that is that Lewis says, in “Meaning 
Without Use” that Kripkenstein’s challenge was “formerly Good-
man’s challenge” (Lewis 1992, 109). He goes on to say that the so-
lution to this challenge (or  should that be ‘these challenges’) in-
volves “carrying  more baggage of primitive distinctions or onto-
logical commitments than some of us might have hoped” (Lewis 
1992, 110). A footnote on that sentence cites “New Work”, in case it 
isn’t  obvious  that  the  baggage  here  is  the  distinction  between 
natural and unnatural properties. So somehow, Lewis thinks that 
natural properties help solve Goodman’s puzzle. I think that the 
simplest such solution is the right one to attribute to Lewis; natu-
ral properties are prima facie more eligible to be projected.
A referee noted that this passage is a little odd; it appears to 
simply conﬂate a meta-semantical paradox with an epistemologi-
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meta-semantical  questions are  epistemological  questions.  Words 
get their meanings in virtue of our conventions. Our conventions 
consist of our beliefs and desires. And facts about rationality are, 
in part, constitutive of what we believe and desire.
Finally, consider the way in which the papers on natural prop-
erties  are  introduced  in  Papers  in  Metaphysics  and  Epistemology. 
Lewis says that “I had been  persuaded by Goodman and others 
that all properties were equal: it was hopeless to try to distinguish 
‘natural’ properties from  gruesomely gerrymandered, disjunctive 
properties.” (Lewis 1999, 1-2) A footnote refers to Fact, Fiction and 
Forecast. Of course, the point of “New Work” is that Lewis aban-
dons this, explicitly Goodmanian, view. Now that he had learned 
property  egalitarianism  from  Goodman  of course  doesn’t show 
that once he  became a property  inegalitarian, he  applied this to 
Goodman’s own paradox. But it does seem striking  that the only 
citation of an egalitarian view is of Fact, Fiction and Forecast. I take 
that  to  be  some,  inconclusive,  evidence  that  Lewis  did  indeed 
think natural properties were related to Goodman’s paradox.
Ultimately,  it  seems  the  textual  evidence  is  this.  There  are 
many different occasions where Lewis makes clear there is a con-
nection between naturalness and rationality, and in particular, be-
tween  naturalness and the  kind of rationality that is relevant to 
content assignment. There are hints that this connection goes via 
naturalness playing  a role in solving  Goodman’s paradox. Nota-
bly, there is no other obvious way in which naturalness could con-
nect to rationality. At least, I can neither think of another connec-
tion,  nor  see  any  evidence  for  another  connection  in  the  Lewis 
corpus. So I conclude, a little tentatively, that Lewis thought natu-
ral properties had a role to play in solving Goodman’s paradox.
4. Word Meaning and Naturalness
In “Languages and Language”, Lewis doesn’t say that human lin-
guistic practices merely determine truth conditions for the spoken 
sentences. That is, our linguistic practices don’t merely determine 
which language, in Lewis’s sense, we speak. They also determine, 
to some extent, a grammar, which speciﬁes the truth conditional 
contribution  of the  various parts of the sentence. The  grammar 
determines the “ﬁne structure of meaning” (Lewis 1975, 177) of a 
sentence or phrase.
In comments on an earlier draft of this paper, an anonymous 
referee stressed that naturalness could enter directly into a theory 
of meaning once we stopped focussing on sentence meaning, and 
started looking  on word meaning. I don’t mean to say the referee 
was endorsing any particular role for naturalness in the theory of 
word meaning. But the point that we need to say more about the 
Lewisian  approach  to  word  meaning  before  we  conclude  that 
naturalness is only indirectly related to meaning is right. And I’m 
grateful for the encouragement to discuss it further.
Lewis has a short discussion of grammars in “Languages and 
Language”,  and  another  in  “Radical  Interpretation”.  It’s  worth 
looking  at both  of  these  in  turn. I’ll  take  “Languages and Lan-
guage” ﬁrst, since even though  it has a slightly later publication 
date, in the respects we’re discussing here it closely resembles the 
theory in Convention.
On pages 177-8 of that paper, Lewis notes three ways in which 
there may be indeterminacy in the grammar.
1.A subject’s behavioural dispositions and anatomy might un-
derdetermine their beliefs and desires.
2.The beliefs and desires might underdetermine the truth condi-
tions of their language.
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the meanings of the individual words.
While Lewis does not think the second is actually a source of inde-
terminacy, he does think that the third is.
My present discussion has been directed at the middle step … I have 
said … that the beliefs and desires of the subject and his fellows are 
such as  to  comprise a  fully determinate  convention  of  truthfulness 
and  trust  in  some  deﬁnite language.  …  I  am  inclined  to  share  in 
Quine’s doubts about the determinacy of the third step. (Lewis 1975, 
178)
Lewis gives reasons for this inclination a few paragraphs earlier. 
He says that while we can say what it is for a community to speak 
one  language  rather  than  another, we  can’t say  what it is for  a 
community to  speak one  grammar  rather  than another. He  says 
that we don’t have any  objective measures for evaluating  gram-
mars. And he says Quine’s examples of indeterminacy of reference 
show that languages can have multiple good grammars, even  if 
these disagree radically about the meaning of some constituents.
Notably,  Lewis  doesn’t  take  to  show  that there  is  anything 
wrong with the notion of word meaning. He says it would be “ab-
surd” (177) to conclude that. His conclusion here is more one of 
modesty  rather  than  philosophical  scepticism.  We  don’t  know 
how to extend the theory of sentence meaning he offers to a theory 
of word meaning, so we should do what we can without talking 
about word meaning.
The approach in “Radical Interpretation” has a bit more of a 
hint for how to restore semantic determinacy. The subject matter 
of that paper is how to solve for the mental and linguistic contents 
of  a  speaker,  called  Karl,  given  the  physical  facts  about  them. 
Lewis uses M for “a speciﬁcation, in our language, of the mean-
ings of expressions of Karl’s language.” (Lewis 1974, 333) He lists 
a number of constraints on a solution, including early versions of 
his principles of constitutive rationality. But the most notable con-
straint, from our perspective, is this:
The Principle of Generativity constrains M: M should assign truth con-
ditions  to  the sentences of Karl’s language in a way that  is at least 
ﬁnitely speciﬁable, and preferably also reasonably uniform and sim-
ple. (Lewis 1974, 339)
There’s something very odd about this. Lewis, in 1974, didn’t have 
a theory of what made an assignment simple. He needed his the-
ory of natural properties to do that. Or, at least, once he had the 
theory of natural properties, it did all the work he ever wanted out 
of an account of simplicity.
Be that as it may, it does suggest that Lewis did think that sim-
plicity of assignments could be used as a way of cutting down the 
third  kind  of  semantic  indeterminacy  discussed  in  “Languages 
and Language”. He doesn’t think it would generate a fully deter-
minate interpretation of Karl’s language.
It  seems  hopeless to  deny, in the face of such examples  as those in 
[Quine’s “Ontological Relativity”, pp. 30-39], that the truth conditions 
of full sentences in M do  not sutﬁce to determine the rest of M: the 
parsings and the meanings of the constituents of sentences. At least, 
that is so unless there is something more than our Principle of Gen-
erativity to constrain this auxiliary syntactic and semantic apparatus. 
(Lewis 1974, 342-3)
It’s notable that some of the examples Quine gives in “Ontological 
Relativity” are  not cases where  the  alternative  meanings are by 
any measure equally natural. This positive allusion to Quine’s ex-
amples suggests a link to this comment in “Languages and Lan-
guage”
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objectively whether,  in  some  tribe,  “gavagai”  is  true of  temporally 
continuant rabbits or time-slices thereof. You can give their language 
a good grammar of either kind—and that’s that. (Lewis 1975, 177)
Note that he doesn’t say ‘equally’ good. And note also how this 
contrasts with the attitude he takes towards the prospects of inde-
terminacy in sentence meaning. I  earlier quoted him  saying  that 
part of the point of “Languages and Language” was to show how 
the second type of indeterminacy didn’t arise. He ends “Radical 
Interpretation” with this ‘credo’.
Could  indeterminacy of  beliefs,  desires, and  truth  conditions  also 
arise because two different solutions both ﬁt all the constraints per-
fectly? Here is the place to hold the line. This sort of indeterminacy 
has not been shown by convincing examples, and neither could it be 
shown–to  me–by proof. Credo: if  ever you  prove to  me that all  the 
constraints  we have yet  found  could permit  two perfect solutions, 
differing otherwise than in the  auxiliary apparatus of M, then you 
will  have  proved  that  we  have  not  yet  found  all  the  constraints. 
(Lewis 1974, 343)
So that’s where things stood before 1983. Lewis thought he had a 
theory that eliminated, or at least minimised, indeterminacy at the 
level of truth conditions. But he didn’t think his theory eliminated 
indeterminacy, even quite  radical  indeterminacy, in  word mean-
ings. And he didn’t seem  bothered by this aspect of the theory; 
indeed, he thought Quine’s arguments showed that we shouldn’t 
eliminate this kind of indeterminacy.
This attitude towards Quinean arguments for indeterminacy is 
obviously a striking contrast to the forcefulness, and rapidity, with 
which  he  responded to  Putnam’s  arguments  for  indeterminacy. 
That shouldn’t be too surprising  once we attend to Lewis’s three-
fold distinction between kinds of indeterminacy. Quine was argu-
ing  that  indeterminacy  of the  third  kind was rampant. Putnam 
was arguing that indeterminacy of the second kind was rampant. 
And, as Lewis announced in “Radical  Interpretation”, he wasn’t 
going to believe any such argument.
Still, we might wonder whether  the resources he brought to 
bear  in  responding  to Putnam  also  help respond  to Quine.  Or, 
perhaps more importantly for exegetical reasons, we might won-
der  whether  Lewis  thought they  were  useful  in  responding  to 
Quine. The evidence from “New Work” seems to suggest a nega-
tive answer to the latter question. Lewis never says that one of the 
things you  can do with the distinction between  natural  and un-
natural properties is respond to arguments for Quinean indeter-
minacy. And that’s despite the fact that “New Work” has a very 
survey-like feel; the bulk of the paper is a long list of philosophical 
work that a theory of universals can do.
In “Putnam’s Paradox” there is a brief footnote on Quine’s ar-
guments for indeterminacy. It reads
It is not clear how much indeterminacy might be expected to remain. 
For instance, what of Quine’s famous example? His rabbit-stages, un-
detached rabbit parts, and rabbit-fusion seem only a little, if any, less 
eligible than rabbits themselves. (Lewis 1984, 228n)
As I’ve  stressed  repeatedly,  following  Schwarz,  taking  the  dis-
claimers at the start of “Putnam’s Paradox” seriously means that 
we have to be careful in interpreting what Lewis says about how 
words acquire determinate meaning in that paper. But even before 
we adjust for the disclaimers, this is hardly a ringing  rejection of 
Quine’s indeterminacy arguments. The contrast to Lewis’s attitude 
towards Putnam’s arguments is striking. Since it is the very same 
contrast  that  we  saw  in  both  “Languages  and  Language”  and 
“Radical Interpretation”, I think it is fair to assume that he contin-
ued to think Quine’s arguments were considerably stronger than 
Putnam’s.
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Use”. Here’s the problem Lewis addresses at the end of that paper. 
Let ℒ1 once again be English as we currently understand it, and let 
ℒ3 be just like English, except that it doesn’t assign any truth con-
ditions to sentences over a thousand words long.6 Do our actual 
linguistic practices manifest a convention of trust in ℒ1, or trust in 
ℒ3? Lewis argues that it is more like a convention of trust in ℒ3. If 
someone utters a very long sentence, we expect some kind of per-
formance error, at best. We don’t, in general, believe what they say. 
So the theory of “Languages and Language” seems to predict that 
these long sentences have no truth conditions. But that’s wrong, so 
the theory must be corrected.
Lewis’s correction  appeals, it seems, to natural properties in 
ﬁxing a grammar. He says that linguistic practice determines truth 
conditions  for  a fragment of the  language  that is widely  used. 
Those truth conditions determine meanings of words. This deter-
mination requires natural properties; without them  the Quinean 
problems multiply indeﬁnitely. We then use those word meanings 
to determine the meaning  of unused sentences. A long  footnote 
suggests that the procedure might not be restricted to unused sen-
tences. As long as there is a large enough fragment in which there 
are conventions of truthfulness and trust, we can extrapolate from 
that to other parts of the language that are used.
This is a marked deviation from anything Lewis had said until 
then. From  the  earliest writings, he  had stressed a  step-by-step 
approach to content determination. Behavioural dispositions plus 
physical  and  biological  constraints  determine  mental  content; 
mental content determines sentence meaning; and sentence mean-
ing  determines  word  meaning.  In  “Meaning  Without  Use”,  it 
seemed the last two steps were being somewhat merged.
But we shouldn’t overstate  how much  the third step was al-
lowed to encroach on the second. Lewis does think we need to 
rule out ‘bent’ grammars, which don’t assign any truth conditions 
to sentences over a thousand words long, or which give sentences 
different meanings to what we’d expect if the word ‘cabbage’ ap-
pears forty times. But he doesn’t think  we need to rule  out any 
‘straight’  grammar, which  includes  “any grammar  that any  lin-
guist would actually propose.” (Lewis 1992, 109)
So  Lewis’s  focus here  is  to  rule  out  unnatural  compositional 
rules, not unnatural assignments of content to  individual words. 
The reference to linguists here might be useful. Linguists tend to 
spend much more time on compositional rules than they do on the 
contents on individual predicates. Notably, Quine didn’t argue for 
indeterminacy  by  positing  indeterminacy  in  the  compositional 
rules of the language; his non-standard interpretations all share a 
standard syntax. If we posit that Lewis thought that there was lit-
tle syntactic indeterminacy in the language, like there is little inde-
terminacy at the level of truth conditions of sentences, we can tell 
a story that doesn’t involve too many unsignalled changes of view. 
Here’s how I would tell that story in some more detail.
Lewis’s early  view,  expressed clearly  in  “Radical  Interpreta-
tion” and “Languages and Language”, and not retracted before, I 
think, 1992, has the following parts:
1.Conventions of truthfulness and trust determine (very sharply) 
truth conditions for sentences in a speaker’s language.
2.Any reasonably good grammar, i.e., assignment of word mean-
ings and compositional rules, that is consistent with the truth 
conditions is not determinately wrong. There is potentially 
substantial indeterminacy in the meaning of any given word, 
because there are many reasonably good grammars consistent 
with the truth conditions. Any grammar that has excessively 
complex compositional rules is not reasonably good.
After 1983, ‘complexity’ was understood in terms of naturalness, 
but otherwise the story doesn’t change a lot.
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, vol. 1 no. 10    [10]The  later  view,  which  goes  by  somewhat  more  quickly  in 
“Meaning Without Use”, has the following parts:
1.Conventions of truthfulness and trust in (the bulk of) the used 
fragment of the language determine truth conditions for that 
fragment.
2.Naturalness considerations determine the compositional rules 
for the language by extrapolation from that grammar.
3.Word meanings are determined, so far as they are determinate, 
by the truth conditions for sentences, plus the compositional 
rules.
4.Truth conditions for sentences outside the used fragment are 
determined by the word meanings and the compositional 
rules.
Neither of these views look much like the orthodox view. Remem-
ber  that the orthodox view has it that considerations of natural-
ness  can  be  used to  resolve  debates in  metaphysics. That’s cer-
tainly the use that Sider (2001a) makes of the orthodox view. But 
on the early view, simplicity considerations only come in after the 
truth  conditions  for  every  sentence  have  been  determined,  and 
hence so that all metaphysical debates are settled. And on the later 
view, simplicity  considerations primarily  are used to settle truth 
conditions for unused, or at least unusual, sentences.
Now if you thought the salient fragment in point 1 of the later 
view was small, and if you thought naturalness had a major role to 
play in step 3 of the later view, you would get back to something 
like the orthodox view. But I don’t see the textual evidence for ei-
ther of those positions. Lewis says that “the used fragment is large 
and varied.” (Lewis 1992, 110) It doesn’t look like he is positing 
wholesale changes to his view on the determination of truth con-
ditions. He is positing some changes; the last two pages of the pa-
per are clearly marked as deviations from his earlier position. But 
both the examples he uses and the rhetoric around them suggests 
that the bulk of the changes happen at point 2. Naturalness con-
siderations constrain the syntax of a language much more tightly 
than they constrain the assignment of meaning to a given word. In 
sum, at no point in the evolution of his views did Lewis seem to 
endorse  the  orthodox  interpretation,  even  as  a  theory  of word 
meaning.
5. An Argument for the Orthodox Interpretation
So far I’ve argued that there is no solid textual support for the or-
thodox interpretation. My rival interpretation relied on there being 
a connection between naturalness and induction, and as we’ve just 
seen, there is some textual evidence for this. But perhaps there is a 
more  indirect  way  to  motivate  the  orthodox  interpretation  of 
Lewis. The  orthodox  interpretation  attributes to  Lewis a theory 
that is quite  attractive  as a theory of semantic determinacy and 
indeterminacy. Call that theory the U&N Theory, short for the Use 
plus Naturalness theory of meaning. Since Lewis was clearly look-
ing for such a theory when he discussed naturalness in the context 
of his theory of content, it is reasonably charitable to attribute the 
U&N Theory to him, as the orthodox interpretation does.
My response to this will be in three parts. First, I’ll argue in 
this section that my rival interpretation attributes to Lewis a the-
ory of semantic determinacy and indeterminacy that does just as 
well at capturing  the facts Lewis wanted a theory to capture, so 
there’s no  charity based reason  to attribute  the  U&N Theory to 
him (And, as we saw in the previous section, there’s no direct tex-
tual reason to attribute it to him  either.) Second, the U&N Theo-
ry is subject to the criticisms in (Williams 2007), while the theory I 
attribute to Lewis is not. Third, the U part of the U&N Theory is 
hopelessly  vague;  it  isn’t  clear  how  to  say  what  ‘use’  is  on  a 
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liver meanings. Either use is so thick that naturalness is unneeded, 
or it is so thin that naturalness won’t be sufﬁcient to set meaning. 
So actually it isn’t particularly charitable to attribute this theory to 
him.
Still, let’s start with the attractions of the U&N Theory. On the 
one hand, agents are inclined to say “All emeralds are green” both 
in situations where they’ve seen a lot of green emeralds (and no 
non-green ones) and in situations where they’ve seen a lot of grue 
emeralds (and no non-grue ones). That’s because, of course, those 
are exactly the same situations. So at ﬁrst glance, it doesn’t look 
like the way in which “green” is used will determine whether it 
means green or grue. On the other hand, once we add a require-
ment that terms have a relatively natural meaning, we do get this 
to fall out as a result. Moreover we can even see how this falls out 
of a recognisably Lewisian approach to meaning.
Consider again our agent who says “All emeralds are green” 
after seeing  a lot of emeralds that are both  green and grue. And 
remember that for her to speak a language, she must typically con-
form  to  conventions of truthfulness and trust in  that language. 
Now if the agent was speaking  ℒ2, she would have to think that 
she’s doing an OK job of being truthful in ℒ2 by saying “All emer-
alds are green”. But that would be crazy. Why should she think 
that all emeralds are grue given her evidence base? To attribute to 
her that belief would be to gratuitously attribute irrational beliefs 
to her. And on Lewis’s picture, gratuitous attributions of irration-
ality are false. So the agent doesn’t have that belief. So she’s not 
speaking ℒ2.
Things  are  even  clearer  from  the  perspective  of  hearers.  A 
hearer of “All emeralds are green” would be completely crazy to 
come to believe that all emeralds are grue. The hearer knows, after 
all, that the  speaker has no acquaintance with  the emeralds that 
would have to be blue for all emeralds to be grue. So the hearer 
knows that this utterance could not be sufﬁcient evidence to be-
lieve that all emeralds are grue. Yet if she speaks ℒ2, she is dis-
posed to believe that all emeralds are grue on hearing “All emer-
alds are green”. She isn’t irrational, or at least we shouldn’t assign 
irrationality to her so quickly, so she doesn’t speak ℒ2.
So it looks like in this one case at least, we have a case where 
use plus naturalness gives us the right theory. Agents are disposed 
to use “green” to describe emeralds that are green/grue. But the 
fact that greenness is more natural than  gruesomeness makes it 
more appropriate to attribute to them  a convention  according  to 
which “All emeralds are green” means that all emeralds are green 
and not that all emeralds are grue.
But more carefully, what we should say is that the U&N Theo-
ry gives us the right result in this case. It doesn’t follow that it will 
work in all cases, or anything  like it. And it doesn’t follow that it 
works for the right reasons. As we’ll see, neither of those claims 
are true. In fact, just re-reading  the last three paragraphs should 
undermine  the  second claim.  Because  we  just saw  a derivation 
that the agents are not speaking ℒ2 that didn’t even appeal to the 
U&N Theory. Rather, that derivation simply  used the theory  of 
meaning  in Convention and the theory of mental content in “Radi-
cal Interpretation”. It’s true that the latter theory assigns a special 
role  to  rationality,  and  the  theory  of  rationality  we  used  has, 
among other things, a role for natural properties, but that is very 
different to the idea that naturalness feeds directly into the theory 
of meaning in the way the orthodox interpretation says. As I said 
at the  start,  I  think  the  best  interpretation  of  Lewis  is  that  he 
changed his theory of rationality in 1983, but that’s the only change 
to his theory of meaning.
Put another way, these reﬂections on “green” and “grue” are 
consistent with the view that the U&N Theory is a false theory, but 
a useful heuristic. It’s a useful heuristic because it agrees with the 
true  Lewisian  theory in  core  cases, and is much  easier  to apply. 
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fact, and as a matter of Lewis interpretation.
6. Indeterminacy and Radically Deviant Interpretations
If the U&N Theory is a heuristic not a theory, we should expect 
that it will break down in extreme cases. That’s exactly what we 
see in the cases discussed in (Williams 2007). Those cases highlight 
the fact that a Lewisian theorist needs to be careful that we don’t 
end up concluding  that normal people, such as the agent in our 
example who says “All emeralds are green”, speak ℒ4. ℒ4 is a lan-
guage  in  which  all  sentences express  claims  about  a  particular 
mathematical model (essentially a Henkin model of the sentences 
the agent accepts), and it is set up in such  a way that ordinary 
English sentences come out true, and about very natural parts of 
the model. On the U&N Theory, it could easily turn out that ordi-
nary speakers are speaking ℒ4, since the assigned meanings are so 
natural. We can  see this isn’t a consequence of Lewis’s theory by 
working  through the case from  ﬁrst principles. I  have two argu-
ments here, the ﬁrst of them relying on some slightly contentious 
claims  about the  epistemology  of mathematics,  the  second  less 
contentious.
Assume, for reductio, that ordinary speakers are speaking ℒ4. 
So, for instance, when O’Leary  says “The  beer is in  the  fridge”, 
what he says is that a certain complicated mathematical model has 
a certain  property.  (And indeed  it  has that property.) Now  this 
won’t be a particularly rational thing  for O’Leary to say unless he 
knows more mathematics than ordinary folks like him  ordinarily 
do. So if O’Leary has adopted a convention  of truthfulness and 
trust in ℒ4, then uttering “The beer is in the fridge” would be irra-
tional, even if he is standing in front of the open fridge, looking at 
the beer. That’s a gratuitous assignment of irrationality, and gra-
tuitous assignments of irrationality are  false, so  O’Leary doesn’t 
speak ℒ4.
Perhaps that is too quick. After all, the mathematical claim that 
ℒ4 associates with “The beer is in the fridge” is a necessary truth. 
And  Lewis’s  theory  of  content  is  intentional,  not  hyper-
intentional. So O’Leary  does know  it is  true. (And  when  he  is 
standing  in front of the fridge, there’s even a sense that he knows 
that “The beer is in the fridge” expresses a truth, if ℒ4 is really his 
language.) I think that’s probably not the right sense of “rational”, 
and  I’m  not  altogether  sure  how  much  hostility  to  hyper-
intensionalism  we  should attribute  to Lewis. But so  as to avoid 
these questions, it’s easier to consider a different argument that 
focusses attention on O’Leary’s audience.
When O’Leary says “The beer is in the fridge”, Daniels hears 
him, and then walks to the fridge. Why does Daniels make such a 
walk? Well, he  wants beer, and believes it is in  the fridge. That 
looks like a nice rational explanation. But why does he believe the 
beer is in the fridge? I say it’s because he’s (rationally) adopted a 
convention  of truthfulness and trust in  ℒ1, and so he rationally 
comes to believe the beer is in the fridge when O’Leary says “The 
beer is in the fridge”. On the assumption that O’Leary and Daniels 
speak ℒ4, none of this story goes through. But we must have some 
rational explanation  of  why O’Leary’s  statement makes  Daniels 
walk to the fridge. So O’Leary and Daniels must not be speaking 
ℒ4.
Michael Morreau  pointed out (when  I  presented this talk at 
CSMN) that the preceding  argument may be too quick. Perhaps 
there  is  a  way  of  rationalising  Daniels’s  actions  upon  hearing 
O’Leary’s words consistent with the idea that they both speak ℒ4. 
Perhaps, for instance, Daniels’s walking  to the fridge constitutes 
saying something in a complicated sign language, and that thing is 
the rational  reply to what O’Leary said. If this kind of response 
works, and I have no reason to think it won’t, the solution is to 
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stance,  not  too long  ago  I  heard Mayor  Bloomberg  say “Lower 
Manhattan  is being  evacuated because  of  the  impending  hurri-
cane”,  and  I  (and  my  family)  packed  up  and  evacuated  from 
Lower Manhattan. Even if one could ﬁnd an interpretation of our 
actions in evacuating that made them constitute the assertion of a 
sensible  reply  to  Bloomberg’s  mathematical  assertion  in  ℒ4,  it 
would be irrational to think I made such an assertion. Evacuating 
ahead of a storm  with an infant is not fun - if it was that hard to 
make mathematical assertions, I wouldn’t make them! And I cer-
tainly  wouldn’t  make  them  in  reply  to someone  who  wouldn’t 
even see my gestures. So I think at least some of the actions that 
are rationalised by testimony, interpreted as sentences of ℒ1, are 
not rationalised by  testimony, interpreted as ℒ4.  By the kind of 
appeal to the principle of charity we have used a lot already, that 
means that ℒ4 is not the language most people speak.
The central point here is that when we are ruling out particu-
larly deviant interpretations of some speakers, we have to make 
heavy  use  of  the  requirement  that  the  interpretation  of  their 
shared language  rationalises what they do. In part that means it 
must rationalise why they utter the strings that they do in fact ut-
ter. And when  we’re considering  this, we  should  remember  the 
role of naturalness in a theory of rationality. But it also means that 
it  must rationalise  why  people  respond to  various strings with 
non-linguistic actions, such as walking to the fridge, or evacuating 
Lower Manhattan. Naturalness has less of a role to play here, but 
the Lewisian theory still gets the right answers provided we apply 
it carefully. Since the Lewisian theory gets the right answers, and 
the U&N Theory gets the wrong answers, it follows that the U&N 
Theory isn’t Lewis’s theory, and so orthodoxy is wrong.
7. What is the Use of a Predicate?
We concluded the last section with an argument that Lewis isn’t 
vulnerable  to  the  claim  that  his  theory  assigns  complicated 
mathematical  claims  as  the  meanings  of  ordinary  English  sen-
tences.  That  interpretation,  we  argued,  is inconsistent with  the 
way those sentences are used. In particular, it is inconsistent with 
the way that hearers use sentences to guide their actions.
So far so good, we might think. But notice how much has been 
packed into the notion of use to get us this far. In identifying the 
use O’Leary makes of “The beer is in the fridge”, we have to say a 
lot about O’Leary’s beliefs and desires. And in identifying the use 
Daniels makes of it, we primarily talk about the sentence’s effects 
on Daniels’s beliefs and desires. That is, just saying  how the sen-
tence is used requires saying a lot about mental states of speakers. 
And that will often require appealing  to constitutive rationality; 
we say that Daniels’s beliefs about the fridge changed because we 
need to rationalise his fridge-directed behaviour.
And this should all make us suspicious about the prospects for 
identifying meaning (in a Lewisian theory) with use plus natural-
ness. The argument above  that naturalness mattered to meaning 
relied on the idea that naturalness matters because it affects which 
states are rational, and hence which states are actualised. A belief 
that all emeralds are grue is unnatural, so it is hard to hold. And 
since it is hard to hold, it is hard to think one is conforming to a 
convention  of truthfulness in a language  if one utters sentences 
that mean, in that language, that all emeralds are grue. That’s why 
it is wrong, ceteris paribus, to interpret people  as speaking  about 
grueness.
But now consider what happened when we were talking about 
Daniels and O’Leary. Even to say how they were using  the sen-
tence “The beer is in the fridge”, we had to say what they believed 
before  and after the sentence  was uttered. In  other words, their 
mental states were constitutive of the way the sentence was used. 
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matters to Lewis’s theory of linguistic content because, and only 
because, it matters to his theory of mental content. (And it only 
matters to  mental  content because it matters  to the  principle  of 
charity that Lewis uses.) If mental  states, and their changes, are 
part of how the sentences are used, it will be rather misleading to 
say that meaning  is determined by use plus naturalness. A better 
thing to say is that meaning is determined by use, and that some 
key parts of use, i.e., mental states of speakers and hearers, are de-
termined in part by naturalness.
So I’m sceptical of the U&N Theory. We can put the argument 
of the  last few  paragraphs as  a  dilemma.  There  are  richer  and 
thinner ways of identifying the use to which a sentence is put. A 
thin way might, for instance, just focus on the observable state of 
the part of the physical world in which the sentence is uttered. A 
rich way might include include, inter alia, the use that is made of 
the sentence in the management of belief and the  generation of 
rational action. If we  adopt the  thin  way of thinking  about use, 
then adding naturalness won’t be enough to say what makes it the 
case that O’Leary and Daniels are speaking ℒ1 rather than ℒ4. If 
we  adopt the rich  way of thinking  about use, then the role that 
naturalness plays in the theory of meaning has been incorporated 
into the metaphysics of use. Neither way makes the U&N Theo-
ry true while assigning  naturalness an independent role. This di-
lemma isn’t just an argument that we shouldn’t attribute the U&N 
Theory to Lewis; it is an argument against anyone adopting that 
theory.
8. From Theory to Applied Semantics
So far we’ve argued that Lewis’s semantic theory did not look a lot 
like the orthodox interpretation. It’s true that he thought the way a 
sentence was used was of primary importance in determining  its 
meaning. And it’s  true that he  thought naturalness mattered to 
meaning. But that wasn’t because naturalness came in to resolve 
the indeterminacy left in a use-based theory of meaning. Rather, it 
was because naturalness was in a part of the theory of mental con-
tent, and specifying  the mental states of speakers and hearers is 
part of specifying how the sentence is used.
But note that these considerations apply primarily to investi-
gations at a very high level of generality, such as when we’re try-
ing  to  solve  the  problems described in  “Radical  Interpretation”. 
They  don’t apply to  investigations into  applied semantics. Let’s 
say we are trying to ﬁgure out what O’Leary and Daniels mean by 
“green”. And assume that we are taking  for granted that they are 
speaking a language which is, in most respects, like English. This 
is hardly unusual in ordinary work in applied semantics. If we are 
writing a paper on the semantics of colour terms, a paper like, say, 
“Naming  the Colours”, we don’t concern ourselves with the pos-
sibility that every sentence in the language refers to some compli-
cated mathematical claim or other.
Now given  those assumptions, we can identify a moderately 
thin notion of use. We know that O’Leary uses “green” to describe 
things that are, by appearance, both green and grue. We also know 
that when O’Leary makes such a description, Daniels expects the 
object will be both  green and grue. So focus on a notion  of use 
such that the use of a predicate just is a function of which objects 
speakers will typically apply the predicate to, and which proper-
ties hearers take those objects to have once they hear the predica-
tion. If we wanted to be more precise, we could call this notion of 
‘use’ simply predication. When  we are  doing  applied semantics, 
especially when we are trying to ﬁgure out the meaning  of predi-
cates, we  typically know which  objects a speaker  is disposed to 
predicate a predicate of, and that’s the salient feature of use. (This 
is  why I  said the  most  accurate  heuristic  would be  meaning  is 
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This identiﬁcation of use wouldn’t make any sense if we were 
engaged in theorising at a much more abstract level. If we are do-
ing radical interpretation, then we have to take non-semantic in-
puts, and solve simultaneously for the values of the subject term 
and the predicate term  in  a (simple) sentence. But when  we  are 
just doing applied semantics, and working  just on the meaning of 
a term  like  “green” in  a well-functioning  language, we can  pre-
suppose facts about the denotation of the subject term in sentences 
like S is green, and presuppose facts about what is the subject and 
what is the  predicate in  that sentence, and then  we  can look at 
which properties hearers come to associate with that very object 
on hearing that sentence.
Now that we have a notion of use that’s distinct from natural-
ness, we can ask whether it is plausible that predicate meaning  is 
use (in that sense) plus naturalness. And, quite plausibly, the an-
swer is yes. The arguments in (Sider 2001a) and (Weatherson 2003) 
in favour of this theory look like, at the very least, good arguments 
that  the  theory  does the  right job  in  resolving  Kripkensteinian 
problems. The theory is immune to objections based on radical re-
interpretations  of  the  language,  as  in  (Williams  2007),  because 
those will be inconsistent with the use so deﬁned. And the theory 
ﬁts nicely into Lewis’s broader theory of meaning, i.e., his meta-
semantics, which  is in turn  well  motivated. So I  think there  are 
good reasons to  hold that when we’re  doing  applied semantics, 
the U&N Theory delivers the right verdicts, and delivers them for 
Lewisian reasons. That’s the heart of what’s true about the U&N 
Theory, even if it isn’t a fully general theory of meaning.
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1 Holton (2003) is more nuanced, but does tell a similar story in the 
context of discussing Lewis’s account of (potential) semantic inde-
terminacy. Weatherson (2010) follows Holton in this respect.
2 As some further evidence for how orthodox the ‘orthodox’ inter-
pretation  is,  note  that  Williams  (2007) is a prize  winning  essay 
published  with  two  commentaries in  the  Philosophical  Review. 
That paper takes the orthodox interpretation as its starting  point, 
and  neither  of  the  commentaries  (Bays  (2007)  and  Hawthorne 
(2007)) criticise this starting point.
3 Schwarz (2006) develops his criticism of orthodoxy in more de-
tail, and in English, but it is as yet unpublished.
4 These points are stressed by Wolfgang  Schwarz (2006, 2009). He 
also notes that in “Putnam’s Paradox” Lewis explicitly sets these 
parts of his theory aside so he can discuss Putnam’s arguments on 
grounds most favourable to Putnam. As Schwarz says, this should 
make us suspicious of the central role “Putnam’s Paradox” plays 
in defences of the orthodox interpretation. We will return to this 
point in the section on textual evidence for and against orthodoxy. 
A referee notes, correctly, that the phrase ‘in the ﬁrst instance’ 
is doing a lot of work here. That’s right; we’ll return in much more 
detail below to Lewisian theories of word meaning, and what role 
naturalness plays in them. 
5 The view I’m attributing to Lewis is endorsed by one prominent 
supporter of the orthodox interpretation, namely Ted Sider. See his 
(2012, 35ff).
6 If you think sentences with a thousand words are too easy to un-
derstand for the argument of this paragraph, make the threshold 
higher; as long  as the threshold is ﬁnite, it won’t affect the argu-
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